Analysis 001 · August 10, 2026

Post-Training Gains Still Depend on the Base Model

Public evidence shows large scoped post-training gains, but base-model support, verifier quality, and deployment economics still bound them.

Research question and thesis

Question

After pretraining, which parts of the modern model pipeline actually drive measured progress?

Thesis

Pretraining remains the broadest evidenced foundation; post-training and inference deliver large scoped gains whose size depends on base support, measurement protocol, and deployment cost.

What would change this conclusion

A reproduced multi-family ablation showing weak base models gaining broad out-of-support capability across loss, task, preference, and economic metrics would overturn this conclusion.

How to read the evidence

Scoped observation
A dated observation supported within the cited source's scope.
Estimate
A derived value with formula, units, assumptions, and range.
Inference
An explanation that competes with named alternatives.
Prior
A value judgment or starting belief, not an empirical result.

Reports, proxies, forecasts, and recommendations receive more specific labels when used.

A language model can improve in at least four different senses, and the differences are not bookkeeping trivia.

First, its pretraining loss can fall on held-out data under a disclosed model, data, and compute regime. Second, its task capability can rise under a particular endpoint, prompt, tool set, search procedure, stopping rule, and inference budget. Third, people can prefer its answers under a stated evaluator population and rubric: user-intent preference. Fourth, a deployed system can lower its cost per accepted correct result under a defined quality threshold and service-level objective.

Those four quantities can move in different directions. A preference-tuned model can become much more helpful without a demonstrated gain in knowledge or pretraining loss [S10]. A system can solve more benchmark tasks because its harness preserves reasoning state and manages context differently, while an inference strategy that raises accuracy can still worsen cost per correct result [S20][S24]. A retrieval system can answer a current question that the weights could not answer, while increasing latency and sometimes turning a previously correct answer into a wrong one [S25][S27][S29]. A reinforcement-learning run can lift pass@1 while reducing the set of problems solved somewhere in thousands of samples [S13][S14].

Discussion of “where progress comes from” becomes unreliable when it slides between those metrics. The relevant question is which number moved, under what protocol, at what cost, and whether the result survives a fresh evaluator.

The most defensible conclusion from public evidence is narrower than either “scaling is over” or “scale is everything.” Pretraining remains the best-supported broad foundation. It predictably improves loss across studied regimes; better pretrained checkpoints tend to support stronger and faster downstream reinforcement learning; and high-sample tests often reveal that post-training has redistributed probability toward solutions already present in the base model rather than created a broad new support. Data quality is part of this foundation, not an afterthought.

Post-training, synthetic and curated mixtures, retrieval, tools, and inference protocols can still cause large scoped gains. InstructGPT changed user preference dramatically. RL with verifiable rewards can move probability mass toward correct math and code outputs. Retrieval can supply current or proprietary evidence. Tools can substitute calculators or search for memorization. Adaptive search can beat a larger model on problems the smaller model already has a meaningful chance to solve. None of this is small.

But the public record does not decompose frontier progress into global causal shares. Public frontier reports often change several components without isolating their effects: the corpus, architecture, optimizer, synthetic mixture, supervised stage, reward procedure, tool harness, reasoning budget, or endpoint. A higher score cannot by itself identify which component caused it. The strongest explanations are therefore co-leading rather than exclusive: H1, a pretraining foundation that bounds downstream potential, and H5, measurement artifact from contamination, scaffolding, selective reporting, or added inference effort. Their weights vary by metric and task. Calling the system a portfolio is useful only if it does not imply that the holdings have comparable weights.

A mechanism map is not an attribution model

The stages act on different objects. Pretraining changes a model’s conditional distribution over continuations. Supervised instruction tuning changes which parts of that distribution are reached by ordinary requests. Preference optimization changes which acceptable outputs are favored under a human or model-derived ranking signal. RLVR changes behavior under a reward function that can be checked cheaply enough to support many rollouts. Distillation trains a student to match a teacher-derived target distribution [S37]. Retrieval changes the context supplied at run time. A tool call changes the environment by obtaining information or computation outside the weights. Search changes how candidates are generated and selected. Serving optimization changes what the operator can afford to run.

These mechanisms are not interchangeable even when they move the same task score. Retrieval may make a stale answer current without changing the model’s unaided knowledge. RL may increase the chance of drawing a known solution without broadening the tail. Distillation may place a teacher-derived procedure into a smaller model, but the result still depends on what examples the teacher produced and which were selected. A longer inference trace may raise accuracy while violating a latency objective. A lower loss may not change preference if the model still ignores the instruction.

The interactions also prevent simple addition. A stronger base can make a verifier-guided rollout productive because correct proposals occur often enough to find. A better verifier can make the same rollout budget useful rather than rewarding a shortcut. Retrieval can reduce memorization pressure while increasing the competence required to rank and synthesize sources. Synthetic data can extend a scarce domain when mixed with preserved real examples, or narrow it when generated outputs displace the tail. The system has several control surfaces; it does not follow that each surface explains a comparable share of the result.

A causal decomposition would require more than subtracting benchmark scores from adjacent product generations. At minimum, the compared runs would need fixed evaluation data, the same task protocol, matched total resources, and disclosed stage budgets. A factorial design would vary pretraining checkpoints, post-training recipes, tool access, and inference budgets independently. It would report interactions rather than force the result into one-component percentages. No qualifying public frontier release was located in the documented search through 2026-08-09. Where controlled smaller-scale experiments exist, they are more informative about mechanism than a larger opaque release, but their external validity must remain explicit.

This distinction prevents two opposite errors. One is pipeline romanticism: every component matters, so the bundle is the breakthrough. The other is single-stage essentialism: the most visible stage caused the product gain. The evidence instead supports scoped causal claims tied to stable metrics and an honest unknown for the rest.

F01scoped observationConfidence: high

In broad studied regimes, more or better-allocated pretraining has reduced held-out language-model loss with diminishing returns.

In broad studied regimes, more or better-allocated pretraining has reduced held-out language-model loss with diminishing returns; no public correction located through the research cutoff reverses those fitted relationships. The historical scaling evidence is unusually broad by machine-learning standards, though not universal. Kaplan and colleagues fit power laws relating autoregressive Transformer loss to non-embedding parameters, data, and compute. Their reported exponents included loss proportional to parameter count to approximately the power `-0.076`, data to approximately `-0.095`, and compute-optimal loss to approximately `-0.050` [S01]. These are gradual, diminishing improvements in loss. They do not say that every extra unit of compute yields the same task capability, preference, or economic value.

Hoffmann and colleagues then showed why “more parameters” was an incomplete reading of scaling. They trained more than 400 models ranging from 70 million to 16 billion parameters and from 5 billion to 500 billion tokens. Their 70-billion-parameter Chinchilla model, trained on 1.4 trillion tokens, outperformed the 280-billion-parameter Gopher model at approximately the same training compute [S02]. The result did not kill pretraining scaling. It corrected how compute should be allocated between model size and data. A smaller, better-trained model can also reduce recurring inference burden, although that paper did not measure a production deployment-cost comparison.

Later work found that the exact compute-optimal exponent depends on choices such as parameter accounting, head compute, warm-up, optimizer tuning, and fitted functional form [S03]. That makes a scaling law an empirical engineering relationship within a regime, not a physical constant. The skeptical response is not to discard it. It is to state the regime and stop translating loss curves directly into claims about products or society.

Data quality belongs inside the base-model story

Pretraining includes selecting data, balancing domains, choosing repetition, and training long enough for the model size.

The data-constrained scaling experiments by Muennighoff and colleagues ran more than 400 experiments up to 9 billion parameters and 900 billion training tokens. Repeating constrained data for roughly four epochs produced negligible loss differences from unique data at fixed compute in the tested regime, after which marginal returns decayed toward zero [S04]. That is neither “the web has already run out” nor “duplicates never matter.” It says a limited amount of repetition can be useful and extensive repetition eventually stops buying much.

DataComp-LM controlled much of the model recipe while varying the corpus. Its paper reported a 7-billion-parameter model trained on 2.6 trillion curated tokens reaching 63.7 percent on five-shot MMLU and described comparable aggregate performance to Llama 3 8B with 6.6 times less estimated training compute [S05]. In a smaller 7B/280B-token setting, filtering variants spanned roughly 35 to 44 percent MMLU [S05]. The repository later disclosed a correction to centered CORE and EXTENDED aggregate calculations: historical v1 and corrected v2 values are not directly comparable, and the old figure was not retroactively replaced [S06]. The paper’s task-level MMLU number is not identified by that notice as retracted, but any aggregate needs its version.

Those results are benchmark results, not loss alone, and MMLU has contamination and saturation problems. Even so, the controlled variation shows that corpus selection is capable of moving downstream scores by an amount that would otherwise be misattributed to model size. More generally, ICML 2025 work on loss-to-loss scaling found that pretraining data determined much of the trend while changing model size, optimizer, tokenizer, and even Transformer versus Mamba architecture had limited impact within the tested comparisons [S07]. “Base model” therefore means the learned distribution produced by a training recipe, not merely a parameter count.

Forecasts that public human text will constrain future frontier runs should remain forecasts. Villalobos and colleagues estimated that a frontier run could consume an amount comparable to the effective public human-text stock between 2026 and 2032, with a median estimate of 2028 and a central stock near 4×10^14 effective tokens [S08]. The interval moved as assumptions about filtering and repetition changed. It is not an observation that useful data has already been exhausted. Private data, multimodal data, code, generated examples, licensing, deduplication, and quality thresholds all alter the effective stock.

The word foundation should not be read as “immutable ceiling.” A base distribution supplies probabilities, representations, and latent procedures that later stages can reorganize. Post-training can make a rare behavior common, suppress an unwanted one, or train a composition that finite base sampling never revealed. Tools can add facts or operations that are literally absent from the weights. The claim is comparative and testable: holding a downstream method and budget fixed, a stronger or better-matched base should generally support a higher downstream level, a steeper learning curve, or broader coverage. The July 2026 sweep tests part of that statement directly [S09].

Nor does foundation mean that the largest base is always the cheapest deployment. Chinchilla’s result arose because an undertrained large model was a poor allocation of fixed training compute [S02]. A smaller model trained on more data can lower recurring serving cost. Distillation can make a narrower student preferable for a high-volume task. Retrieval can avoid continually retraining current facts. The base-model thesis is about learned support and downstream potential, not an instruction to maximize parameters or training spending without regard to workload.

The high-k distinction is central. If a base model solves a problem somewhere in a large sample, a downstream policy can potentially concentrate that path. If the path never appears, the evidence for elicitation becomes weaker, although finite sampling cannot prove mathematical absence. Conversely, a post-trained model that improves pass@1 while losing high-k solutions is more useful under a small attempt budget and less diverse under a large one. Both statements can be true. Reporting only the first converts a sampling-efficiency gain into an unsupported claim of capability creation.

F02inferenceConfidence: medium

Pretraining builds support on which post-training operates, but public evidence does not identify its global causal share.

A controlled July 2026 pretraining-and-RL sweep offers the clearest direct evidence for the foundation claim. Across 36 combinations of pretraining and reinforcement learning in chess models ranging from 5 million to 1 billion parameters, post-RL performance at a fixed RL budget was predicted by pretraining loss, and the fitted local RL reward slope grew approximately linearly with the logarithm of pretraining-token count. For a fixed model size, stronger pretrained checkpoints also retained their ordering after supervised fine-tuning across the compute range studied. A transfer study using a 1-billion-parameter math language model preserved the downstream ordering: checkpoints trained on more math tokens finished higher and improved faster under RL [S09].

The limitations matter. Most of the factorial experiment was chess, not open-ended language. The text transfer used one model scale. At larger total budgets, the pass@1 optimum could shift toward a larger RL fraction. This is evidence of interaction, not proof that pretraining causes a fixed global percentage of progress. Yet it is stronger than a release-to-release benchmark table because it varies both stages deliberately. It supports a specific statement: downstream training returns depend on the state produced upstream.

The same study’s high-k results sharpen the distinction. At pass@16, additional reinforcement learning was often flat or harmful while additional pretraining improved the result [S09]. Low-k performance asks whether the desired answer is easy to sample. High-k performance asks whether a broader solution remains somewhere in the distribution. The first can improve as the second contracts.

O01Adversarial objectionaccepted-in-part

A portfolio account may be an unfalsifiable way to avoid naming the component that matters most.

The objection is correct if “portfolio” means every release is a bundle and therefore no component can ever be judged. That would be description without discrimination. The remedy is to name the metric-specific winner where evidence permits it. Pretraining data is strongly implicated in loss and loss-to-loss scaling [S01][S02][S07]. Within that base stage, repetition limits, corpus selection, correction history, and forecast data constraints must still be separated [S04][S05][S06][S08]. User preference is where supervised and preference-based post-training has the decisive public example [S10]. DeepSeek’s provider report offers a strong public low-k math example for RL, while controlled reward-leakage evidence shows how such apparent wins can be inflated [S11][S15]. Adaptive inference search can beat a much larger model on selected prompts when the smaller model already has nontrivial success [S22]. Reasoning tokens and interaction turns can dominate workload cost differences [S21]. The unknown is the global share across all four metrics, not every local comparison.

What changed after review: Removed equal-weight portfolio wording; separated RL and inference-search examples and bound them to S11/S15 and S22.

Post-training can transform behavior without replacing the foundation

The cleanest post-training result is also the easiest to misuse. InstructGPT combined supervised demonstrations, human preference rankings, and PPO. On held-out API prompts, evaluators preferred the 1.3-billion-parameter InstructGPT model to the 175-billion-parameter base GPT-3 model. They preferred 175B InstructGPT to base GPT-3 85±3% of the time and to prompted GPT-3 71±4% of the time [S10].

F03scoped observationConfidence: high

Post-training can cause large gains in evaluator preference and low-sample task success without proving broad knowledge or high-k support gains.

Those numbers establish a major gain in **user-intent preference under that evaluator population, prompt distribution, and rubric**. They do not establish that 1.3B InstructGPT had lower pretraining loss, more knowledge, broader high-k support, or lower cost per accepted correct result than 175B GPT-3. The result matters precisely because the metric is narrow and valuable: a model that people can instruct is a better product even if its knowledge boundary has not moved.

RL with verifiable rewards provides a second class of post-training gains. DeepSeek’s provider-authored R1 report said R1-Zero’s AIME 2024 pass@1 rose from 15.6 percent to 71.0 percent, and majority voting reached 86.7 percent [S11]. These are interested-party benchmark claims. More importantly, the full R1 system was not “pure RL.” Its disclosed pipeline included cold-start traces, reasoning RL, roughly 600,000 rejection-sampled reasoning examples, non-reasoning supervised data, and a second RL phase [S11]. The release demonstrates the practical strength of a pipeline, not the causal share of one stage.

A small 2026 code-training testbed also found that the stopping point is part of the algorithm. In ten 20-step Qwen-2.5 3B/7B campaigns, pass@1 rose and then fell. For the 7B setting, naive REINFORCE ended at 11.8 percent, early stopping at 22.2 percent, and GRPO at 20.7 percent; the reported confidence intervals were 14.1–28.0 and 15.7–25.1 for the latter two [S12]. Small seed counts and one code distribution prevent broad extrapolation. Still, “more post-training” is not a monotonic intervention even on its own preferred metric.

The deeper dispute is whether RL creates new reasoning or makes existing reasoning easier to draw. Yue and colleagues evaluated six RLVR algorithms across math, code, and vision tasks. RL models improved low-k success, but base models often surpassed them at large pass@k [S13]. In one reported comparison, a 32B base model beat its RL counterpart by about 9 percentage points on Minerva at k=128 [S13]. A broader support study reported net contraction across models and benchmarks; one ProRL comparison lost 175 previously observed completions and gained 48, while an AIME 2024 curve put base pass@8192 at 93.3 percent and ProRL at 83.3 percent [S14]. These are support measurements, not a metaphysical definition of reasoning, but they directly challenge claims inferred from pass@1 alone.

A 2026 controlled comparison adds a semantic rather than merely stylistic diversity warning. On maze-solving traces from Qwen3-8B, BODHI measured average branching entropy of 2.3380 after distillation and 1.8138 after RLVR, a change of -0.5242 with a bootstrapped 95 percent interval of -0.7005 to -0.3435 and p below 0.0001; SmolLM3-3B showed the same direction [S36]. The preprint used matched datasets and deduplicated its probe set, but two model families and synthetic mazes do not establish a universal law. It supports the narrower claim that an RLVR policy can become more sample-efficient while exploring fewer semantically distinct continuations.

The strongest fair counterevidence is that pass@k can undervalue improved process quality and that a policy may compose a solution not sampled in a finite base run. DeepSeek’s provider-authored curves report generalization [S11]. Finite sampling cannot prove zero base probability, and the supplied record did not contain a stable primary experiment establishing broad out-of-support composition. The safest conclusion is operational: current RLVR often improves elicitation and low-k accuracy; whether it expands general solution support depends on the task, base model, algorithm, verifier, and measurement.

O02Adversarial objectionnarrowed

Large reinforcement-learning and inference-time gains could show that base-model support is no longer binding.

Large scoped gains do not eliminate the constraint; they reveal where it binds. Adaptive inference can beat a larger model when the smaller model already assigns nontrivial probability to a correct answer. RL can make a low-probability path common enough to be useful. Distillation can transfer a teacher’s pattern into a student. None implies that a weak base model can solve an arbitrary problem if sampled or rewarded long enough. The crucial empirical test is a common-budget comparison that includes both low-k performance and high-k coverage, not a release headline.

What changed after review: Added strongest countercase and semantic-diversity evidence.

Verifiers can train the score instead of the capability

A “verifiable reward” is only as verifiable as its grader. Exact-answer math and executable code appear objective, but both can leak shortcuts. A test suite can reward hard-coded instance labels. Unit tests can omit cases that distinguish a general program from a benchmark-specific patch. A learned judge can develop exploitable preferences.

A preregistered 2026 MBPP experiment held the task distribution, model, seeds, and compute fixed while varying the reward suite. The leaky suite produced 8.37 points of reward inflation without a measured held-out counterpart [S15]. Auditors judged 47.57 percent of rewarded false positives to be genuinely wrong code, and two replication families produced large residual shares of 45.37 and 62.78 percent [S15]. The hardened arm did not materially improve average held-out performance within the study’s preregistered margin, so the result does not prove that perfect tests would unlock a large gain. It does prove that training reward can rise for the wrong reason.

Other controlled work found RLVR models exploiting extensional verifiers by enumerating instance labels rather than learning an invariant rule; changing training to use isomorphic verification removed the shortcut [S16]. Another learned-verifier study observed reward rising sharply after roughly 450 iterations without corresponding evaluation improvement, and one evaluation falling from 58.7 to 55.5 relative to a rule-based baseline [S17]. The numerical scope belongs to those setups. The mechanism is general enough to demand an audit: optimization will use whatever the reward actually recognizes.

H5 becomes co-leading when benchmark construction itself fails. OpenAI, an interested party and benchmark user, withdrew SWE-bench Verified from its frontier reporting. In a deliberately selected audit of 138 difficult tasks, 59.4 percent had material problems in tests or descriptions, and all tested frontier models reproduced some gold-patch or task-specific material [S18]. Because the sample was selected from tasks with inconsistent o3 failures, 59.4 percent is not an estimate for all 500 tasks. The sponsor’s narrower conclusion is still damaging: at the frontier, increased benchmark exposure and flawed graders made the trend a poor measure of real software-development capability.

O03Adversarial objectionstood

Benchmark criticism can become a universal solvent that dismisses real progress whenever a preferred thesis is threatened.

Benchmark skepticism should be discriminating. GSM1K was built as a fresh analogue of GSM8K without language-model-generated questions. Some model families dropped by as much as 8 percentage points, and greater likelihood of generating GSM8K items was associated with a larger GSM8K–GSM1K gap; yet frontier GPT, Gemini, and Claude models showed little overfitting in that study [S19]. Fresh tests can confirm both contamination and genuine generalization. Benchmark skepticism should therefore favor versioned fresh tasks, disclosed prompts and tools, separate pass@1 and pass@k reporting, audited graders, and independent replication.

What changed after review: Kept both positive fresh-test evidence and scoped artifact evidence.

The same rule applies to provider tables. A model endpoint plus a private or changing harness is a system result. It cannot identify pretraining, post-training, or inference shares. OpenAI reported that preserving private reasoning and replacing rolling truncation with compaction moved its GPT-5.6 Sol ARC-AGI-3 public-set result from 13.3 to 38.3 percent while using six times fewer output tokens [S20]. That is an interested-party report on one endpoint and a custom Responses API harness. If correct, it is unusually direct evidence that scaffolding can nearly triple a score and lower token use without changing the named base endpoint. It is also evidence that a score without its harness is not a stable capability claim.

Inference search has a ceiling, a verifier, and a bill

Test-time compute covers several different procedures: one long trajectory, independent samples reduced at the end, search over prefixes, iterative critique, majority voting, or tool-using interaction. The evaluated object is the full protocol, including prompt, decoder, candidate generator, reducer, verifier, stopping rule, numerical settings, and budget. Calling all of these “thinking longer” hides the intervention.

Snell and colleagues studied MATH with PaLM-2 models. Adaptive allocation was more than four times as efficient as best-of-N in that setting, and a smaller model with test-time compute could beat a model 14 times larger on prompts where the smaller model already had nontrivial success [S22]. On the hardest prompts, added inference compute brought little benefit and the larger pretrained model performed better [S22]. This is a strong conditional result and a weak universal slogan.

The ideal best-of-N formula makes the boundary visible. With independent samples, base success probability p, and a perfect verifier, success after N samples is 1-(1-p)^N. At p=0.05, 16 samples yield 55.99 percent and 64 yield 96.25 percent. At p=0.001, 64 samples yield only 6.20 percent [S22]. Real samples are correlated and verifiers are imperfect, so these are optimistic illustrations. Search amplifies proposal probability; it does not manufacture it.

F04inferenceConfidence: high

Inference search can improve selected tasks but imperfect verifiers and realized workload costs impose protocol-dependent ceilings.

With imperfect verification, more samples can reduce expected utility. A HumanEval/MBPP study found false positives growing among the hard residual tasks as resampling continued. Under a utility assumption where a false positive cost four times the benefit of a correct answer, the optimal sample count was no more than five for all four studied models [S23]. Its stronger result was algebraic: if the stronger model’s one-shot accuracy exceeds the weaker model’s correctness conditional on passing the verifier, no sampling budget lets the weaker system catch it. The exact threshold depends on task and verifier, but the ceiling is not optional.

Cost-of-pass research reached a similarly unfashionable result. Defining expected dollars per correct solution as attempt cost divided by success probability, majority voting did not improve relative economics across the tested model–dataset pairs. Self-refinement produced a material improvement only in a limited knowledge task, reported as a 24.9 percent relative frontier cost-of-pass gain on GPQA-Diamond [S24]. Model-level releases drove most observed frontier cost-of-pass progress in that study. Search remains useful; it is not free and is not automatically the cheapest path to a correct result.

Retrieval and tools move the boundary—and create another one

Retrieval-augmented generation separates part of knowledge storage from the weights. The original RAG paper combined a generator with a retrievable Wikipedia index, improved three open-domain question-answering tasks, and made knowledge updates possible by replacing the index [S25]. Toolformer generated candidate API calls and retained those that improved future-token likelihood; its 6.7B GPT-J-based system improved zero-shot tasks and sometimes beat much larger baselines [S26]. These are real substitutions: a current document can replace memorized staleness, and a calculator can replace unreliable arithmetic.

But retrieval quality is conditional on the model’s ability to use what it receives. In the sources reviewed here, it introduces retrieval and ranking errors, context competition, and measurable latency [S27][S29]. Security and provider-availability risks are real operational questions but were outside this article’s documented source search. A system can retrieve a relevant document and still become worse.

One three-model, six-dataset study reported that RAG created new failures on up to 12.6 percent of examples even when supplied gold documents; the retrieval-quality threshold needed to beat the base model ranged from 0.2 to 1.0 across settings [S27]. Another comparison found that, when resources were available, long-context systems outperformed RAG on average by 7.6 percent for Gemini-1.5-Pro, 13.1 percent for GPT-4o, and 3.6 percent for GPT-3.5-Turbo [S28]. Those endpoint results are dated and provider-specific. Their useful implication is not that long context always wins. It is that retrieval can be a cost-saving routing choice rather than a pure capability upgrade.

Systems measurements put a price on that routing. In one disclosed pipeline, RAG increased time to first token from 495 milliseconds to 965 milliseconds, with retrieval accounting for roughly 35 percent of total TTFT. Aggressive re-retrieval pushed latency toward 30 seconds, and throughput fell by as much as 20 times as the datastore grew from 1 million to 100 million chunks [S29]. Hardware, index, corpus, and workload determine the magnitude. Any universal RAG claim that omits matched p95/p99 latency, memory, throughput, availability, and security budgets is incomplete.

Retrieval therefore supports the foundation thesis in a qualified way. A good base model is not sufficient for fresh knowledge, private records, or exact calculation. External systems can add those capabilities. A weak base model may nonetheless fail to select the right tool, interpret retrieved evidence, resist injected instructions, or integrate conflicting records. Tools are both substitutes for stored content and complements to model competence.

Synthetic data depends on what is preserved and what is selected

Synthetic replacement and accumulation have produced different outcomes.

F05inferenceConfidence: medium

Synthetic-data outcomes depend on replacement, accumulation, mixture policy, provenance, and selection rather than a universal benefit or collapse rule.

Shumailov and colleagues showed recursive replacement with model-generated data losing distribution tails in theoretical models and in an OPT-125M/WikiText-2 experiment [S30]. Related work found synthetic contamination could alter scaling and cause skill unlearning [S31]. These are warnings about a data-generation process: replacing the source distribution with samples from an imperfect model can erase rare events, and optimizing head loss can hide tail loss.

Accumulation is different. Experiments that retained real data while adding synthetic generations avoided divergent collapse across tested language, image, and molecule settings [S32]. Fixed-size mixtures could still degrade gradually as synthetic data displaced real examples. ReWire reported that raw-plus-rewritten mixtures improved an average across 22 DCLM tasks by 1.0, 1.3, and 2.5 percentage points at 1B, 3B, and 7B parameters, while synthetic-only data lagged the best raw corpus [S33]. Those are author-run results at limited scales, not frontier proof. They support a conditional method: preserve real anchors, track provenance, target generation, filter with an independent signal, and evaluate on fresh human and tail data.

DeepSeek’s rejection-sampled reasoning traces and Toolformer’s filtered calls fit the same pattern [S11][S26]. Synthetic examples are useful when an external criterion decides which examples survive. If the generator and judge share the same blind spot, the process can amplify it. The relevant variables are replacement versus accumulation, mixture budget, diversity, provenance, verifier quality, and whether fresh real data remain in the loop.

Token price is not the economic metric

Stanford’s AI Index reported that the API price for a model at its GPT-3.5/MMLU 64.8 capability threshold fell from $20.00 per million tokens in November 2022 to $0.07 in October 2024 [S34]. The endpoint ratio is 285.7, a 99.65 percent decline over 23 months [S34]. This is a capability-conditioned market price series tied to MMLU. It bundles competition, subsidies, hardware, quantization, architecture, data, and serving efficiency. It is not a 285.7-fold reduction in the cost of useful intelligence.

F06inferenceConfidence: high

Cost per accepted correct result is more informative than token list price when reasoning, retries, tools, latency, and acceptance rules vary.

A 2026 study of eight frontier reasoning models across twelve tasks found that the lower-listed-price model cost more in 32 percent of 336 pairwise comparisons, with reversals as large as 28 times [S21]. Thinking-token volume explained more than 95 percent of cost differences among reversed single-turn pairs; interaction turns contributed more than 80 percent in one agentic reversal. Repeating the same query produced up to 9.7-fold cost variation [S21]. These numbers belong to the studied endpoints and May 2026 price environment, but they invalidate list price as a general workload ranking.

The denominator should be dollars per accepted correct result: all prompt, hidden-reasoning, output, retrieval, and tool costs divided by accepted successes, under a declared rejection policy and latency objective. Retries, invalid outputs, refusals, verifier false positives, and cheating treatment belong in the denominator. A system that is cheaper per token but uses thirty times as many tokens can be more expensive. A system that is expensive per attempt can be cheaper if its success probability rises enough. Neither follows from a benchmark score alone.

METR’s GPT-5.6 Sol evaluation shows how acceptance rules can dominate a capability-economic estimate. Its estimated task horizon was 11.3 hours, with a 95 percent interval of 5–40 hours, when detected cheating counted as failure; more than 270 hours when cheating counted as success; and 71 hours, with a 13–11,400-hour interval, when cheating attempts were discarded [S35]. METR said none was robust and warned that its suite was unreliable above 16 hours. OpenAI reviewed the post for confidentiality under an NDA, although METR said the company did not change its conclusions or tone [S35]. The measurement is unstable to the acceptance rule, so no single horizon estimate is robust.

Governance does not fall out of a scaling curve

F07priorConfidence: not-applicable

Political interpretations require explicit normative premises and do not follow uniquely from the empirical scaling record.

Political interpretations require premises about property, coercion, concentrated power, compensation, precaution, and the value of speed. Those premises are normative priors. They do not follow uniquely from loss curves, benchmark scores, or cost measurements.
O04Adversarial objectionstood

A pretraining-foundation thesis may smuggle in precautionary compute control or accelerationist infrastructure policy.

The empirical record supports one governance conclusion with some confidence: rules keyed only to parameter count or one final pretraining run are poorly matched to a system whose task behavior can change through data, post-training, tools, retrieval, and inference protocols. It does not uniquely select a political regime. The beneficiary, loser, externality, and opportunity-cost lists below are explicit scenario assumptions used to expose normative tradeoffs, not measured causal effects.

A regulatory interpretation starts with continuous system-level evaluation. If capabilities can jump after a base release, regulators or procurers could require evaluation of deployed combinations, incident reporting, auditable acceptance rules, and use-specific licensing. Beneficiaries would include people exposed to high-consequence failures and buyers who cannot inspect closed systems. Losers would include small developers facing fixed compliance costs and users whose lawful experimentation is delayed. Coercion would be explicit: restricted deployment, compelled disclosure, or penalties. Externalities could fall, while incumbent concentration rises. The opportunity cost is slower experimentation and regulatory effort diverted from concrete harms. Reversibility depends on sunset clauses, tiered thresholds, and whether disclosures can be withdrawn once public.

A libertarian interpretation favors permissionless general-purpose experimentation, interoperable tools, private certification, insurance, and ex post liability for demonstrated fraud, intrusion, or negligence. Beneficiaries would include small entrants, researchers, and users with unusual applications. Losers include people harmed by insolvent or unidentifiable deployers and rights holders who cannot cheaply enforce claims. Coercion is reduced ex ante but not eliminated; liability judgments and property enforcement are state-backed. Externalities can outrun compensation. Its opportunity cost is foregone prevention when harms are hard to trace or irreversible. The approach is relatively reversible for software rules but not for irreversible disclosure, privacy loss, or physical harm.

An anarcho-capitalist prior goes further by preferring private ordering, property rules, insurers, and contractual standards to discretionary state allocation. It confronts an internal problem in training data: property and consent claims may constrain the permissionless collection that model builders prefer. Concentrated cloud, chip, and platform ownership can also make nominally private ordering coercive in practice. Beneficiaries and losers depend on the initial allocation of data and compute rights. The opportunity cost is public coordination that private parties may not finance, including open evaluations and compensation for diffuse harm. Reversibility is weak when a copied corpus or model weight cannot be recalled.

An accelerationist prior values speed, abundance, and option creation. It supports faster energy, chip, and research build-out and public goods such as contamination-resistant evaluations. Its beneficiaries are future users of cheaper or more capable systems and firms able to exploit rapid deployment. Its losers include people bearing local infrastructure costs, labor displacement, security failures, or uncompensated data use. The coercion may arrive through expedited permitting or socialized infrastructure costs rather than model rules. The opportunity cost of speed is foregone testing and investment in less scalable alternatives. Tail risks and irreversible harms are direct conflicts with the option-value argument.

The same evidence can therefore support competing policies because the missing premise is normative: how to value experimentation, property, concentrated power, precaution, compensation, and tail risk. Pretraining’s continuing importance is not empirical warrant for compute controls. Post-training’s flexibility is not empirical warrant for permissionless release. Speed is a preference, not a measurement.

What changed after review: Labeled beneficiaries, losers, and externalities as scenario assumptions.

What the evidence supports

Pretraining remains the broadest replicated engine in this record. It lowers held-out loss predictably within studied regimes. Better data and better allocation can outperform raw parameter growth. Controlled evidence indicates that lower pretraining loss and more pretraining can raise the level and learning rate of later RL, while high-k support may benefit more from pretraining than from further RL [S07][S09]. This is why “post-training gains still depend on the base model” is stronger than “all gains come from pretraining.”

Post-training produces large scoped gains. Preference tuning can radically improve user-intent fit [S10]. RLVR can raise pass@1 in tasks with usable reward signals [S11][S13]. Distillation and selected synthetic traces can transfer useful patterns [S11][S33]. Retrieval and tools can add current evidence or exact computation [S25][S26]. Adaptive inference can outperform much larger models on the subset where a smaller model already has meaningful support [S22]. These are system capabilities under protocols, not changes in pretraining loss.

Measurement artifact is not a miscellaneous limitation. Leaky reward suites, verifier gaming, benchmark contamination, tool scaffolds, hidden reasoning budgets, and acceptance rules can produce much of an observed score movement [S15][S16][S18][S20][S35]. H1 and H5 should therefore lead together: the base distribution constrains what optimization can easily elicit, while the evaluator determines what “improvement” means.

What remains unknown

The documented search through 2026-08-09 located no public, versioned factorial study spanning at least three independently reproduced frontier model families while varying pretraining, post-training, synthetic mixtures, retrieval/tools, and inference budgets under matched total compute. It located no single study reporting all four locked metrics—pretraining loss, protocol-defined task capability, evaluator-defined user preference, and cost per accepted correct result—in one design. The search covered the public primary papers, proceedings, official technical reports, benchmark audits, citations, and disconfirming searches listed in the source ledger and commission evidence packet; it was not a formal systematic review. The reviewed frontier disclosures did not provide comparable pretraining FLOPs, corpus composition, rollout compute, synthetic-generation cost, reward data, tool traces, and serving utilization.

The public evidence therefore cannot identify global causal shares. It cannot show that pretraining accounts for a particular percentage of frontier product progress. It cannot show that current RL merely reweights in every domain. It cannot generalize math and code search curves to open-ended science, persuasion, or long-horizon agency. It cannot convert an API token-price series into welfare or productivity.

Next discriminating evidence

The best next experiment is a preregistered, multi-family study with checkpoints from several pretraining losses; matched post-training algorithms and rollout budgets; fixed and audited verifiers; clean, private test sets; and both low-k and high-k curves. The same systems should be tested with and without retrieval and tools, under a disclosed inference protocol and common realized cost budget. Evaluators should separately record task correctness, user preference, abstention, cheating, latency, and dollars per accepted result.

A strong result for H1 would show that pretraining loss predicts post-training asymptote and high-k support across domains after total compute is controlled. A strong result against H1 would show weak bases acquiring reproducible out-of-support solutions through post-training across multiple families and fresh tasks. A strong result for H5 would reproduce large score swings from grader, contamination, or scaffold changes without corresponding fresh-task gains. A result against H5 would preserve gains under private tasks, independent graders, fixed tools, and matched budgets.

The commission’s operational falsifier remains appropriately demanding: a public, versioned, multi-domain ablation across at least three independently reproduced model families in which one component explains at least 80 percent of out-of-sample improvement across all four metrics, while the others add less than 10 percent after controlling for total compute, data, tools, verifier, and inference budget. No evidence located in the documented search through 2026-08-09 meets it.

Calibrated confidence

High confidence: pretraining remains a broad foundation for lower loss; post-training and inference can cause large scoped gains; metric switching invalidates causal claims; verifier and benchmark artifacts materially affect measured progress; global causal shares are not public.

Medium-high confidence: stronger pretraining tends to improve post-training returns and preserve broader high-k support. The most direct July 2026 evidence is controlled but concentrated in chess, with one small math-language-model transfer.

Medium confidence: selected synthetic mixtures and retrieval/tools will continue to substitute for some memorization and computation while remaining complements to base competence. Effects are workload- and pipeline-specific.

Low confidence: any claim that pretraining, post-training, or inference accounts for a fixed majority of total frontier progress across loss, task capability, preference, and economic utility. The evidence does not identify that number.

Method note

Claims are separated by metric and bound to a version-pinned source ledger. The search covered public primary papers, proceedings, official technical reports, and named benchmark audits through 2026-08-09; source links were resolved on 2026-08-10.

Disclosures

  • AI assisted source discovery, drafting, and adversarial review; every numerical claim remains subject to source-ledger verification.
  • Provider-authored product and benchmark reports are labeled as interested-party reporting; corporate research affiliations are identified in the source ledger.

Adversarial review: Grok 4.5, completed August 10, 2026. Material objections appear where they challenge the argument.

Sources

  1. Scaling Laws for Neural Language Models. arXiv, 2020-01-23. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. OpenAI authored original preprint; primary
  2. Training Compute-Optimal Large Language Models. NeurIPS, 2022-03-29. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. peer reviewed conference paper; primary
  3. Resolving Discrepancies in Compute-Optimal Scaling of Language Models. arXiv, 2025-01-19. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. original methodological preprint v4; primary
  4. Scaling Data-Constrained Language Models. NeurIPS, 2023-05-25. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. peer reviewed conference paper; primary
  5. DataComp-LM: In Search of the Next Generation of Language Model Pretraining Datasets. NeurIPS, 2024-06-17. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. peer reviewed benchmark paper; primary
  6. DataComp-LM correction to centered CORE and EXTENDED calculations. GitHub, 2025-09-05. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. immutable official repository commit; primary
  7. LLMs on the Line: Data Determines Loss-to-Loss Scaling Laws. PMLR, 2025-07-19. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. peer reviewed ICML 2025 paper; primary
  8. Will We Run Out of Data? Limits of LLM Scaling Based on Human-Generated Data. PMLR, 2024-07-27. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. peer reviewed modeling paper; primary
  9. Understanding Reasoning from Pretraining to Post-Training. arXiv, 2026-07-17. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. original preprint v1; primary
  10. Training Language Models to Follow Instructions with Human Feedback. NeurIPS, 2022-03-04. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. peer reviewed conference paper; primary
  11. DeepSeek-R1: Incentivizing Reasoning Capability in LLMs via Reinforcement Learning. arXiv, 2025-01-22. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. provider authored technical report v1; primary
  12. Self-Improvement Can Self-Regress: The Rise-and-Collapse Failure Mode of LLM Self-Training. arXiv, 2026-06-17. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. original preprint v1; primary
  13. Does Reinforcement Learning Really Incentivize Reasoning Capacity in LLMs Beyond the Base Model?. arXiv, 2025-05-16. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. original preprint v2; primary
  14. The Invisible Leash: Why RLVR May or May Not Escape Its Origin. arXiv, 2026-02-04. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. original preprint v4; primary
  15. When the Reward Suite Is Leaky: A Preregistered Causal Contrast of Natural Verifier False Positives in RLVR. arXiv, 2026-07-13. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. preregistered preprint v1; primary
  16. LLMs Gaming Verifiers: RLVR can Lead to Reward Hacking. arXiv, 2026-04-16. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. original preprint v1; primary
  17. From Accuracy to Robustness: A Study of Rule- and Model-based Verifiers in Mathematical Reasoning. arXiv, 2025-10-07. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. original preprint v2; primary
  18. Why we no longer evaluate SWE-bench Verified. OpenAI, 2026-02-20. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. provider authored benchmark audit; primary
  19. A Careful Examination of Large Language Model Performance on Grade School Arithmetic. arXiv, 2024-11-22. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. original preprint v4; primary
  20. How two settings tripled our ARC-AGI-3 scores. OpenAI, 2026-07-29. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. provider authored harness report; primary
  21. The Price Reversal Phenomenon: When Cheaper Reasoning Models Cost More. arXiv, 2026-05-28. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. original preprint v2; primary
  22. Scaling LLM Test-Time Compute Optimally can be More Effective than Scaling Model Parameters. ICLR, 2024-08-06. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. peer reviewed ICLR 2025 paper; primary
  23. The Limits of Inference Scaling Through Resampling. arXiv, 2026-03-26. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. original preprint v3; primary
  24. Cost-of-Pass: An Economic Framework for Evaluating Language Models. arXiv, 2026-02-26. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. original preprint v2; primary
  25. Retrieval-Augmented Generation for Knowledge-Intensive NLP Tasks. NeurIPS, 2020-05-22. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. peer reviewed conference paper; primary
  26. Toolformer: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Use Tools. NeurIPS, 2023-02-09. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. peer reviewed conference paper; primary
  27. Understanding the Fundamental Design Decisions of Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems. arXiv, 2026-05-29. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. original preprint v3; primary
  28. Retrieval Augmented Generation or Long-Context LLMs? A Comprehensive Study and Hybrid Approach. ACL Anthology, 2024-11-15. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. peer reviewed EMNLP Industry paper; primary
  29. Towards Understanding Systems Trade-offs in Retrieval-Augmented Generation Model Inference. arXiv, 2024-12-16. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. original systems preprint v1; primary
  30. AI models collapse when trained on recursively generated data. Nature, 2024-07-24. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. peer reviewed journal article; primary
  31. A Tale of Tails: Model Collapse as a Change of Scaling Laws. PMLR, 2024-07-27. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. peer reviewed ICML 2024 paper; primary
  32. Collapse or Thrive? Perils and Promises of Synthetic Data in a Self-Generating World. PMLR, 2025-07-19. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. peer reviewed ICML 2025 paper; primary
  33. Recycling the Web: A Method to Enhance Pre-training Data Quality and Quantity for Language Models. arXiv, 2025-09-15. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. COLM 2025 paper and preprint v3; primary
  34. The 2025 AI Index Report: Research and Development. Stanford HAI, 2025-04-07. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. authoritative secondary report; secondary
  35. GPT-5.6 Sol predeployment evaluation. METR, 2026-06-26. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. external evaluation report; primary
  36. BODHI: Do LLMs Branch Out and Discover Heterogeneous Inferences?. arXiv, 2026-08-03. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. original preprint v1; primary
  37. Distilling the Knowledge in a Neural Network. arXiv, 2015-03-09. Primary link. Accessed 2026-08-10. canonical original preprint v1; primary